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execution had always been available to enforce judgment costs, as
opposed to motion costs.
It is important to note that the stay power is discretionary.
The court will take into consideration the merits of the case, the
impecunious status of the litigant, as well as other circumstances
in determining whether to exercise the stay. Lastly, although the
subsequent action need not be identical to the prior action, it must
be shown to be sufficiently similar to it, i.e.:
the common law discretionary power to stay will be available if the
second action has the purpose of seeking some form of relief, previously
available, for the same or substantially the same conduct in the same
sequence of events regardless of the form of action or the legal categories in which the conduct may be classified. 20 6
CPLR 5105: Enforcement of money judgment by contempt held
not to apply to remedial fiduciary situation.
As a general rule, money judgments can be enforced solely
by execution under Article 52.207 CPLR 5105(2) is an exception;
it provides that where the judgment "requires a trustee or person
acting in a fiduciary relationship to pay a sum of money for a
willful default or dereliction of his duty,"208 contempt proceedings
under CPLR 5104 may be employed to enforce the judgment.
The basic reason for the enactment of this statute and its predecessor, CPA § 505(5), was that the law, as a matter of policy,
requires a higher standard of conduct of a fiduciary or trustee
than of a person with whom one deals at arm's length. 20 9

As

a consequence, the fiduciary is vulnerable to contempt proceedings
when he violates this trust. It has been argued that remedial relationships such as constructive trusts,

21 0

should be included within

the scope of CPLR 5105(2), giving the term fiduciary its broadest
meaning. 211 However, it must be recognized that such an expansive reading of the term "fiduciary" would greatly increase the
number of exceptions to the present rule, so as to make the con-
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tempt process
212 more readily available for the -enforcement- of money,
judgments.
In National Sur. Cbrp. v. Silver,2 13 the Court of Appeals
reversed the appellate division,214 and held that the remedies
against fiduciaries contained in CPLR 5105(2) did not apply
where a bonded employee had embezzled funds from his employer,
the plaintiff's insured. In its decision, the Court reasoned that
the employee did not stand in the fiduciary relationship to his
employer that was contemplated by the statute. The judgment,
therefore, could be nothing more than a "money judgment rendered
. . . with the consent of the defendant," 215 the equivalent of a
direction for a recovery of converted funds. As a money judgment
in conversion it is not enforceable by contempt proceedings but
only by execution under Article 52.The crucial factors in determining the applicability of CPLR
5105(2) are the nature of the relationship between the parties and
the nature of the wrong.2 16 It is this fiduciary relationship that
is the basis of the power to punish for contempt. Such a relationship was held not to exist when an agent converted moneys given
him by plaintiff in the course of business 217 or where a final
judgment was issued directing plaintiff to pay defendant a sum of
On the other hand, the relationship has been held
money. 218
to exist between a mother and a daughter to whom she had turned
over her funds in trust,219 between two persons engaged in a joint
venture,220 and between an executrix and sole heir.22 1 In each
of the latter situations a consensual trust was involved, while the
22 Ibid. See The Biannual Survey of New York Practice, 40 ST. JOH's
L. REv. 303; 347 (1966).
213 17 N.Y.2d 477, 214 N.E2d 162, 266 N.Y.S2d 983 (1966).
214 National Sur. Corp. v. Silver, 23, App. Div. 2d 398, 261 N.Y.S.2d
511 (1st Dep't 1965). See The Biannual Survey of Kew York Practice,
40 ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 303, 346 -(1966). This court applied CPLR 5105(2)
to a situation where a remedial trust was involved. Until reversed in the
instant decision, the lower court's opinion appeared to be authority for the
enforcement of a judgment by contempt against any defendant found to be
a constructive trustee.
215 Id. at 398, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
See Hennig v. Abrahams, 246 App.
Div. 621, 282 N.Y. Supp. 970 (2d Dep't 1935).
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217 Matter of Longslow, 167 N.Y. 314, 60 N.E. 590 (1901).
218 Harris v. Elliot, 163 N.Y. 269, 57 N.E. 406 (1900).
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1 Pieper v. Renke, 4 N.Y.2d 410, 151 N.E2d 837, 176 N.Y.S2d 265
(1958).
220R. C. Gluck & Co. v. Tankel, 12 App. Div. 2d 339, 211 N.Y.S2d
602 (1st Dep't 1961).
221 Lefkowitz v. Grosswald, 33 Misc. 2d 905, 906, 225 N.Y.S2d 386, 389
(Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1962), aff'd uithout opinion, 16 App. Div. 2d 889,

229 N.Y.S2d 736 (lst Dep't 1962).
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instant case involved a remedial trust. Thus, the Court has Shown
its reluctance to expand the, term fiduciary to the constructive
or remedial fiduciary situation. In addition, the Court has not
found a situation such as the present one to be sufficiently reprehensible to warrant characterizing it as "willful default or dereliction"
of duty. This being so, enforcement of the judgment in such a
case can be brought by execution only.
ARTICLE

52-

ENFORicEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS

CPLR 5221(a): County in which money judgments are to be
enforced; defect in venue is waivable.
In Silbert v. Silbert 22 2 the corporate garnishee had been
served with a restraining order issued by the Supreme Court, of
Westchester County, in a separation action instituted by a wife
against her spouse, an employee of the garnishee. The corporate
garnishee, however, despite the restraining order, paid the husband
over $30,000 of which $6,000 was in dividends. Upon the wife's
motion, the court held the garnishee, whose only place of business
was in New York County, guilty of contempt for, its violation
of the restraining order. The appellate division, second department,
affirmed the lower court on this issue stating that although CPLR
5221 (a) requires that such a proceeding be brought in the county
in which the garnishee resides, which in this instance was New
York County and not Westchester County, such defect in venue
was waived by the garnishee's failure to take timely exception
thereto. It reversed in part, however, holding that the restraining
order did not reach wages and certain of the dividends which had
been assigned to other judgment creditors.
CPLR 5221 (a) specifically requires that a proceeding under
Article 52 must be commenced in "a county in which the respondent
resides or is regularly employed or has a place for the regular
transaction of business." 223 "Unless it meets the test of subdivision (a), the county in which the judgment was rendered is not
a proper place for an Article 52 special proceeding." 224 Generally
this rule takes into account the convenience of the respondent (the
apt to
garnishee here) and the probability that he will be more
2 25
be present in the county where he conducts his business
222 25
223

App. Div. 2d 570, 267 N.Y.S.2d 744 (2d Dep't 1966).
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